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The notion of a contract as an agreement regulating the behaviour of two (or
more) parties has long been studied, with most work focusing on the interaction
between the contract and the parties. This view limits the analysis of contracts
as first-class entities — which can be studied independently of the parties they
regulate. Deontic logic [1] has long sought to take a contract-centric view, but
has been marred with problems arising from paradoxes and practical oddities [2].
Within the field of computer science, the holy grail of contracts is that of a deon-
tic logic sufficiently expressive to enable reasoning about real-life contracts but
sufficiently restricted to avoid paradoxes and to be computationally tractable.
Contract automata [3–5] have been proposed as a way of expressing the
expected behaviour of interacting systems, encompassing the deontic notions of
obligation, prohibition and permission. For instance, the contract automaton
shown in Fig. 1 expresses the contract which states that ‘the client is permitted
to initialise a service, after which, he or she is obliged to submit valid user
credentials and the provider is prohibited from increasing the price of the service.’
Note that the states are tagged with the deontic information, explicitly stating
what actions are obliged (O), permitted (P) and forbidden (F) by which party
(given in the subscript). The transitions are tagged with actions which when
taken by the parties induce a change of state, with ∗ being used as shorthand to
denote anything-else.
Pc(initialise) Oc(login)Fp(increase)
initialise
logout
∗ ∗
Fig. 1. Service provision contract
The use of automata to describe contracts allows for their composition in a
straightforward manner using standard techniques from computer science. For
instance, consider a bank client who has a savings account and a loan with the
bank. The complete actual contract between the bank and its client is the com-
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position of the two contracts regulating the different accounts. This approach
thus not only enables the description, analysis and validation of contracts inde-
pendently of the agents, but also allows for a compositional approach to contract
construction.
A limitation inherent to the notion of contract automata is that they describe
norms and ideal behaviour only through the knowledge of the agents’ actions. No
part of a contract may depend on whether or not another part of the contract
was violated or not. For example, clauses such as ‘if the bank does not give
permission to the client to open a new bank account, it is obliged to pay a fine.’
Similarly, it is impossible to specify clauses which depend on whether another
clause is also in force, such as ‘if p is obliged to pay, he is forbidden from leaving
the shop.’ Note the difference between the two cases — whereas the first depends
on whether or not a clause is satisfied, the second depends on whether a clause
is enforced. We are currently looking into ways of extending the semantics of
contract automata to allow for these two kinds of scenarios.
Reparation: Contracts identify ideal behaviour which is not necessarily ad-
hered to — although the contract between the bank and the client states
that the client is to ensure that the repayments are done on time, the client
does not always do this, in which case another clause would ensure that he
or she is now also obliged to pay a fine. These reparatory contract clauses are
crucial to allow for the description of behaviour under non-ideal behaviour.
This can be handled, for instance, by qualifying transitions also with deon-
tic clauses (or their negation), ensuring that they can only be taken if the
clause is satisfied (or violated). The initial state of the automaton shown
in Fig. 2(a) shows how this construction is used to ensure that party 1 is
permitted to download file A (downloadA), as long as party 2 has permission
to download file B (downloadB)1.
Although in the example, the tagged clause appears in the source state of
the transition, this is not necessarily the case and the approach can be used
to reason about clauses as though they were in force in that state — hypo-
thetical clauses. For instance, leaving out the P2(downloadB) in the initial
state of the automaton in Fig. 2(a) would result in a similar contract but in
which no violation is tagged when the transition to the next state is taken.
Note that, for a complete semantics one would have to have two types of
violations: (i) those violations which took place but have an associated repa-
ration (violating P2(downloadB) in the initial state of Fig. 2(a)); and (ii) vio-
lations for which there is no associated reparation (violating P1(downloadA)
in the same state). This allows us to make a distinction between satisfying
the contract outright and satisfying but through the taking of reparations.
Conditional clauses: Another extension to contract automata are conditional
clauses, based on whether a clause is in force at a particular moment in time
e.g. ‘if Peter is obliged to pay, then Peter is forbidden from leaving the shop’,
1 For completeness we would also want to add which party is satisfying or violating
the clause on the transition.
Dealing with the Hypothetical in Contracts 3
or ‘if Peter is not permitted to leave the shop then Peter is prohibited from
smoking.’ Fig. 2(b) shows how the first of these examples can be encoded in
a contract automaton. Such conditional clauses are particularly useful when
composing contract automata, since the presence of particular clauses may
not be known before the actual composition.
P1(downloadA)
P2(downloadB) F1(downloadA)
¬P2(downloadB) ` ∗
P2(downloadB) ` ∗ ` ∗
Op(pay) . Fp(leave) Pp(enter)
leave
enter∗ ∗
Fig. 2. (a) party 1 is permitted to download file A, as long as party 2 has permission
to download file B; (b) if p is obliged to pay, then p is forbidden from leaving the shop.
The interaction of these two forms of deontic tagging can be used to express
complex scenarios. For instance, the last example can be extended in such a
manner that if Peter violates the prohibition from leaving (when in force), he
would be forbidden from entering the shop again. Note that in such a case the
transitions may also need to be tagged with conditional deontic clauses.
Furthermore, in these examples we have simply tested for the satisfaction/vi-
olation or presence/absence of a single contract clause. Extending this approach
to deal with sets of clauses (in a conjunctive or disjunctive manner) or even for
whole boolean expressions over these new operators can possibly lead to com-
plex constructiveness issues similar to the ones which arise in Esterel [6]. Even
without complex expressions, such cases may arise. For instance, how should the
clause !Op(a) . Op(a) be interpreted? Does it mean that (i) the obligation to
perform a should always be in force even when it is was going not to be the
case, or that (ii) it is a void statement which should be disallowed, since if the
obligation is not in force, then we add it, but since it is now in force the clause
enforcing it no longer triggers and hence cannot be considered to be in force?
These and other similar issues make the definition of the formal semantics of
such contracts challenging and the development of algorithms for the discovery
of conflicts in such contracts non-trivial.
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